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Abstract 
Bright Internet research was launched as a core project of the AIS Bright ICT Initiative, which aims 
to build an ICT-enabled Bright Society. To facilitate research on the Bright Internet, we explicitly 
define the goals and principles of the Bright Internet, and review the evolution of its principles. The 
three goals of the Bright Internet are: the realization of preventive security, the provision of the 
freedom of anonymous expression for innocent netizens, and protection from the risk of privacy 
infringement that may be caused by preventive security schemes. We respecify design principles to 
fulfill these seemingly conflicting goals: origin responsibility, deliverer responsibility, identifiable 
anonymity, global collaboration, and privacy protection. Research for the Bright Internet is 
characterized by two perspectives: first, the Bright Internet adopts a preventive security paradigm in 
contrast to the current self-centric defensive protective security paradigm. Second, the target of 
research is the development and deployment of the Bright Internet on a global scale, which requires 
the design of technologies and protocols, policies and legislation, and international collaboration and 
global governance. This research contrasts with behavioral research on individuals and organizations 
in terms of the protective security paradigm. This paper proposes validation research concerning the 
principles of the Bright Internet using prevention motivation theory and analogical social norm 
theory, and demonstrates the need for a holistic and prescriptive design for a global scale information 
infrastructure, encompassing the constructs of technologies, policies and global collaborations. An 
important design issue concerns the business model design, which is capable of promoting the 
propagation of the Bright Internet platform through applications such as Bright Cloud Extended 
Networks and Bright E-mail platforms. Our research creates opportunities for prescriptive 
experimental research, and the various design and behavioral studies of the Bright Internet open new 
horizons toward our common goal of a bright future. 
Keywords: Bright Internet, Cybersecurity, Preventive Security, Origin Responsibility, Deliverer 
Responsibility, Identifiable Anonymity. 
1 Introduction 
The Internet has been primarily concerned with 
efficient massive transmission and wide propagation 
up to this point. At its beginning stages, the threat of 
anonymous users was not a primary concern because 
users were considered as mutually trustworthy 
researchers. However, the status of anonymous crimes 
and terror in cyberspace has become a serious issue and 
has indeed reached intolerable levels. Currently, users 
of Internet security systems must protect their own 
systems defensively, under the assumption that 
external attacks are uncontrollable. As such, the time 
has come for cyberspace to move from an anarchic age 
to an ethical age characterized by trust and 
responsibility in order to protect the safety of innocent 
global netizens.  
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In this paper, we propose the idea of the Bright 
Internet, which adopts the paradigm of preventive 
security by eliminating global sources of cybersecurity 
threats instead of merely defensively protecting users’ 
own systems. For this purpose, assurances of 
traceability and the identifiability of malicious origins 
and deliverers are absolutely necessary. However, 
sacrificing legitimate rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression is also unacceptable, and adopting 
preventive security schemes may infringe on these 
rights. Thus, our challenging aim is to prescriptively 
design the Bright Internet so that these seemingly 
conflicting goals can be simultaneously achieved for 
innocent global netizens. Sharing the common vision, 
we define the Bright Internet as “the Internet that can 
preemptively reduce origins of cybersecurity threats by 
having the capability of identifying malicious origins 
and deliverers on a global scale, while maintaining the 
freedom of anonymous expression and a legitimate 
level of privacy protection for innocent netizens.” Note 
that we distinguish innocent netizens from criminal 
ones because it is impossible to design a feasible 
solution without such a distinction. 
The United Nations World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) shared the same view with this 
definition, as declared in paragraphs 57 and 42 of the 
Tunis Agenda (WSIS, 2005) under the Chapter of 
Internet Governance: 
57. “The security and stability of the Internet 
must be maintained.” 
42. “… We affirm that measures undertaken to 
ensure Internet stability and security, to fight 
cybercrime and to counter spam, must protect and 
respect the provisions for privacy and freedom of 
expression as contained in the relevant parts of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the Geneva Declaration of Principles”  
However, there is no specific design theory yet 
developed that is capable of fulfilling these conflicting 
goals on a global scale; thus, little progress has been 
made in this direction. The problem can be solved 
neither by technology, nor policy alone. No single 
country can solve this problem, and there is also no 
commonly agreed-upon global design capable of 
solving this problem. 
To cope with this complex problem collectively, the 
Council of the Association for Information Systems 
(AIS) adopted the Grand Vision Project for the ICT-
enabled Bright Society (in short, the Bright ICT 
Initiative) in December 2014. The vision of the Bright 
Internet has focused, in particular, on the 
abovementioned issue, attracting the attention of 
numerous researchers in the information systems (IS) 
community. Lee (2015) sketched out the initial concept 
in an editorial article published in the MIS Quarterly. 
As a next step, this paper intends to formalize the goals 
and principles, and demonstrate the behavioral and 
design research of the Bright Internet so that follow-on 
studies can emerge. 
The three goals of the Bright Internet are the following: 
(1) Realize the preventive security infrastructure that 
can deter the motivation of cybercrime and terror 
originators; 
(2) Maintain the freedom of anonymous expression for 
innocent netizens by distinguishing them from 
criminal ones; and  
(3) Protect innocent netizens from the risk of privacy 
infringement that may be caused by adopting 
preventive security schemes. 
To fulfill these seemingly conflicting goals, we 
propose five design principles based on prevention 
motivation theory and analogical social norm theory: 
principles of origin responsibility, deliverer 
responsibility, identifiable anonymity, global 
collaboration, and privacy protection, as shown in 
Figure 1. These five principles evolved from four 
principles initially proposed by Lee (2015). To equip 
the Bright Internet with the capacity to prevent state-
led cyberattacks, we need to add a new set of 
principles, termed the Internet Peace Principles, as 
described in the second half of this special JAIS issue 
(Shin, Lee, & Kim, 2018). 
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Figure 1. Goals, Principles, Solutions, and Applications for the Bright Internet 
Research for the Bright Internet can be characterized 
according to two perspectives. First, the Bright Internet 
adopts a preventive security paradigm, in contrast to 
the current self-centric defensive protective security 
paradigm. We need to differentiate the preventative 
paradigm and demonstrate its benefit using its 
prototype and the empirical data collected from the test 
bed. Second, the target of our research is the 
development and deployment of the Bright Internet on 
a global scale, which will require the design of 
technologies and protocols (technologies in short), 
policies and legislation (policies in short), and 
international collaboration and global governance 
(global collaboration in short); this contrasts with 
behavioral research on individuals and organizations 
under the protective security paradigm.  
In this paper, we propose validation research 
concerning the principles of the Bright Internet 
through prevention motivation and analogical social 
norms perspectives. An experimental study will be 
necessary to validate these principles. The comparative 
behaviors of different countries should also be studied 
in the context of current information system security 
theories. As such, this paper does not aim to complete 
the goal of our research, but rather seeks to open 
research opportunities and inspire contributions from 
our colleagues. This research contrasts with 
descriptive empirical studies in that the purpose of this 
research involves prescriptive research leading to the 
validation of principles for a safe next-generation 
Internet to come.  
We also demonstrate the need for a holistic and 
prescriptive global-scale information infrastructure 
design, encompassing the scopes of technology, 
policy, and global collaboration. We propose a 
prescriptively specified technology requirement that 
can be propagated with consistency to the policy 
requirement and, in turn, the global collaboration 
requirement. We review this global scale design 
research from the design science perspective, although 
the factors to consider for its design differ significantly 
from the design of an organization information system 
(Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004). Applications for 
business models may be designed after the Bright 
Internet platform is established. However, the opposite 
deployment approach may be adopted because a 
market-driven business model with killer applications 
can propagate the Bright Internet even without 
governmental regulation. In this paper, we offer some 
examples of business models in our discussion of the 
Bright Cloud Extended Networks and the Bright E-
mail platform. The various application designs of the 
Bright Internet will eventually open a wide research 
horizon for business models development. 
The remaining sections are organized as follows: 
Section 2 describes the typology of Bright Internet 
research by characterizing the preventive security 
paradigm, as contrasted with the protective security 
paradigm, and compares the design research of the 
global scale information infrastructure with the 
existing literature on individual and organizational 
behavioral research. Section 3 proposes the validation 
methods for the Bright Internet principles, and 
suggests the kind of experimental study that should be 
done as the next step of research. Section 4 designs the 
Bright Internet holistically, encompassing 
technologies, policies and global governance; we also 
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describe the market-driven business models here. 
Section 5 summarizes this paper, reviews the design of 
the Bright Internet from the perspective of design 
science, and proposes future research opportunities. 
2 Characteristics of Bright Internet 
Research 
The following reviews the progress of the Bright 
Internet Initiative, and contrasts Bright Internet 
research with the existing literature in the areas of 
information systems security and privacy. 
2.1 Progress of the Bright Internet 
Initiative 
The vision of the Bright Internet has been widely 
presented at many academic conferences, including the 
International Conference on Information Systems 
(ICIS 2015), Pacific Asia Conference on Information 
Systems (PACIS 2015), International Federation for 
Information Processing (IFIP), Information Systems 
Security Working Group (IFIP 2015), the AIS Special 
Interest Group (SIG) of Security and Privacy (SIGSEC 
2015), IEEE/ACM International Conference on Utility 
and Cloud Computing (Lee, 2016b), and so forth. 
Along with active discussions on various panels and in 
workshops at AIS conferences, the research 
framework of Bright Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT) and the Bright 
Internet are described by Lee (2015). The taxonomy of 
Bright ICT research has been elaborated, and the 
concept of Macro Information Society (McIS) research 
has been contrasted with organization-level 
Management Information Systems (MIS) research 
(Lee, 2016a). At ICIS in December 2015, the AIS and 
United Nations International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) signed a memorandum of understanding 
on the joint pursuit of research and standardization of 
the Bright Internet framework as a potential platform 
for a trustworthy Internet. 
The Bright Internet China Symposium was held at 
Xi’an Jiaotong University in June 2017, and the first 
AIS Bright Internet Global Summit was held as a pre-
ICIS 2017 workshop in Seoul. The Journal of the 
Association for Information Systems (JAIS) is 
publishing a special issue on the Bright ICT Initiative 
(2018), where Shin et al. introduce the Internet Peace 
Principles.1 
                                                     
1 A dedicated web page is available at 
www.brightinternet.org. 
2.2 Preventive Security Paradigm 
versus Protective Security 
Paradigm 
Current cybersecurity systems follow the protective 
security paradigm, which aims to protect their own 
systems from external attacks, under the assumption 
that the sources of attack are uncontrollable (Krebs, 
2015). Typical solutions adopted for protective 
security are Anti-DDoS, firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems, anti-APT (advanced persistent threat), and 
threat management systems. Even if firewalls become 
higher and thicker, hackers will develop longer ladders 
to jump over them and more sophisticated drills to 
break through them. Even though intrusion detection 
systems (Rowland 2002) have been developed for 
known attacks, it is impossible to protect newly 
devised ones. APTs (Virvilis & Gritzails, 2013) spread 
their malware in several pieces across time, and thus 
make attacks more difficult to detect. Threat 
management systems aim to protect data leakage and 
intellectual property rights. The battle between the 
spear and the shield never ends, and there is no 
guarantee that the protection system is safe enough. As 
the Internet of things (IoT) becomes widely 
propagated, these attacks will even endanger human 
lives, and the damage will become more catastrophic. 
Small and medium enterprises can neither understand 
the entire spectrum of security problems and solutions, 
nor can they afford to invest in them. The Ponemon 
Institute reported that 80% of businesses cannot 
properly manage external cyberattacks, even though 
the solutions cost $3.5 million, on average, per year 
(Forrest, 2016). Shin et al. (2018) analyzed seven 
typical state-led cyberattacks cases from 11 factors of 
view. 
In contrast, the Bright Internet aims to eliminate 
sources of external attack and adopts a proactive 
preventive security paradigm. This means that the 
origin servers will be evaluated by Bright Internet 
indices, and thus, servers will be motivated to filter 
outgoing malicious messages and deter the illegal 
access of criminal hackers using their servers. The 
origin servers will also be subject to a victim-driven 
reporting procedure. The two paradigms are contrasted 
in Figure 2. However, while origin servers will be 
motivated to take preventive measures, in response to 
either market-driven pressures or regulations imposed 
for societal benefit, it is nevertheless clear that the goal 
of the preventive paradigm cannot be fully achieved by 
individual organizations or countries alone. Therefore, 
due to the global nature of the Internet, the Bright 
Internet must be designed from a global perspective. 
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The necessity of preventive measures is also stressed 
in the Tunis Agenda (WSIS, 2005), paragraph 43, as 
follows: “We reiterate our commitments to the positive 
uses of the Internet and other ICTs and to take 
appropriate actions and preventive measures, as 
determined by law, against abusive uses of ICTs as 
mentioned under the Ethical Dimensions of the 
Information Society of the Geneva Declaration of 
Principles and Plan of Action.” 
We argue that it is necessary to balance the 
combination of protective and preventive security tools 
in order to minimize the total security risk and total 
security-related cost. For this purpose, it is essential 
that we pay more attention to preventive security 
research, such as Bright Internet research. 
 
Figure 2. Protective Security Paradigm vs. Preventive Security Paradigm 
2.3 Behavioral Research Concerning 
the Validity of the Bright Internet  
Information security has been one of the fastest-
growing research areas in the field of information 
systems. In fact, information systems journals have 
mainly focused on the behavioral research aspect, 
while engineering journals have focused on the design 
and technology aspects. The gap between the two 
communities has become wider, although integration 
between them is critical in solving real-world 
problems. To conceptualize the taxonomy of the 
information system security literature, in contrast with 
Bright Internet research, we classify selected articles 
published at major information systems journals into 
two dimensions, as in Figure 3. The horizontal axis 
denotes the target entity (individual, organization, or 
society), while the vertical axis indicates the research 
methodology (behavioral science or design science). 
Note that a broad range of theories from adjacent 
domains, such as economics, psychology, sociology, 
and even computer science, is applied to these studies. 
It is worth highlighting that most previous studies 
assume that the sources of cyberattacks are 
uncontrollable and have investigated the issues in 
terms of protective security. Also, these studies rely on 
behavioral science research to determine the causes 
and effects of individual or organizational security. 
Most of these studies view security problems from the 
intraorganizational perspective, focusing on the 
attempts to protect against invasion or mitigate the 
misuse of information within the organization. 
Thus far, no previous publications in the information 
systems field have investigated the design of a global 
scale Internet platform that aims to control the sources 
of external attacks. In this regard, Bright Internet 
research can be positioned as a global-scale social 
information system that requires a holistic design of 
the necessary technologies, policies, and global 
collaborations guided by the five principles. To 
understand netizens’ perceptions about Bright Internet 
principles before the system is developed or deployed, 
we need a priori experimental research to justify its 
development. However, when the system becomes 
deployed in the future, a posteriori empirical research 
will be necessary to evaluate its performance in 
practice. Behavioral studies should be conducted at 
various levels of individuals, organizations, and 
countries. The discrepancy between different levels 
will generate useful policy implications. We review the 
perspectives of the existing information systems 
literature below. 
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Note: Typical examples of previous studies are presented in each category. Topics in the shaded box are potential 
research areas of the Bright Internet.  
Figure 3. Position of Bright Internet Research 
2.3.1 Behavioral Research of Information 
Security at the Individual Level 
Individual behavioral studies have dealt with topics of 
behavioral security, protection motivation, and 
information security threat. With respect to these 
topics, protection motivation theory, coping theory, 
and information foraging theory have been 
investigated based on field studies, experiments and 
log data analyses. Understanding the context of the 
individual is important in research design, whether the 
individual is in the home, company, or society. For 
instance, Anderson and Agarwal (2010) studied the 
home computer user context and developed a model of 
the conscientious cybercitizen, suggesting that the 
security behaviors of home computer users are 
associated with cognitive, social, and psychological 
components. Wang, Xiao, and Rao (2015) highlighted 
two types of information security threats—unknown 
risk and dread risk—that yield a differential impact on 
information search behaviors in the context of 
university students’ Internet use. Chen and Zahedi 
(2016) examined cultural differences in online security 
behaviors between the United States and China, and 
survey participants are recruited by university students 
in the United States and through online social networks 
in China. Steinbart, Keith, and Babb (2016) 
investigated individual behaviors affected by IT 
artifacts by creating a mobile application and a website 
to conduct a field experiment of 568 individual end 
users. Johnston and Warkentin (2010) conducted a 
survey experiment at a large university and concluded 
that fear appeals may have significant but differential 
impacts on the security-related behaviors of end users.     
In contrast, at its early stage of design, Bright Internet 
research requires experimental studies to assess 
individuals’ perceptions about Bright Internet 
principles. Such studies will help to clarify the 
prescriptive requirements of netizens for the next-
generation Internet. If individuals are reluctant to 
accept preventive security principles, but feel that such 
principles are necessary for society, voluntary 
acceptance will likely be difficult, and these principles 
will need to be regulated or otherwise motivated. 
Creating market-driven business models, such as 
“trustworthiness as an asset” (e.g., when individuals 
voluntarily authenticate themselves in order to use 
credit cards), are important research opportunities that 
could assist in motivating individuals to voluntarily 
participate in the new principles of the Bright Internet, 
even without regulation. Studies of individual 
perceptions can also extend to the national 
cybersecurity perspective. A comparative international 
study regarding the priority of the five principles 
would be interesting and insightful for understanding 
differences between countries and figuring out what 
principles could be adopted for a global common 
platform. A group of scholars in South Korea, the 
USA, China, and other countries is currently working 
on this issue.  
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2.3.2 Behavioral Research of Information 
Security at the Organizational 
Context 
Organizational behavioral studies have dealt with 
topics of security management, security policy 
compliance, behavioral security, organizational 
information security policy, information disclosure, 
software vulnerability, and information systems 
security. These papers have examined general 
deterrence theory, protection motivation theory, 
principle agent theory, social control theory, and 
neutralization theory based on field studies, database 
analyses, and framework development. Willison and 
Warkentin (2013) highlighted that while previous 
studies have primarily focused on individuals’ security 
compliance decisions, it is necessary to extend our 
view toward the interplay between the thought 
processes of offenders (that may precede the violation) 
and the organizational context. 
There is a stream of studies related to internal 
information security policy/technology and human-
related issues. For instance, in order to understand 
delinquent behavior, Herath and Rao (2009b) proposed 
a principal-agent paradigm by emphasizing the proper 
level of sanctions. Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat 
(2010) identified the importance of factors such as 
attitude, normative beliefs, awareness, and self-
efficacy that force employees to comply with 
information security policies. Similarly, Herath and 
Rao (2009a) and D’Arcy, Hovav, and Galletta (2009) 
used general deterrence theory to explain employees’ 
compliance intentions. Their findings suggest that 
organizational commitment, social influence, and user 
awareness of security countermeasures are important 
factors contributing to internal security-related rules or 
reducing IS misuse. Consistent with previous work, 
Hsu, Shih, Hung, and Lowry (2015) argued for the 
significance of organizational extra-role behaviors 
(security behaviors that are not specified in 
information security policies). Their findings also 
emphasized that social control (e.g., employees’ 
commitment, attachment, and beliefs) may play a 
pivotal role in enhancing both in- and extra-role 
security behaviors. Mitra and Ransbotham (2015) 
further examined how the degree of disclosure on 
software vulnerability affects the diffusion of attacks. 
Their findings suggest that full disclosure of 
vulnerability may lead to a faster diffusion of attacks 
and a higher risk of the first attack than a situation of 
limited disclosure.  
Prescriptive experimental studies on an organization’s 
behavior or an individual’s behavior in the 
                                                     
2 For the sake of brevity, we do not provide a comprehensive 
literature review regarding information. Instead, we focus on 
organization while participating in Bright Internet 
services and business could generate interesting 
research topics. These studies would be able to 
demonstrate new business models, which could create 
a new horizon of trustful services who adopt the Bright 
Internet platform. For example, the effects of 
disclosing a company’s origin responsibility index 
would be an important research topic that would 
change the behavior of preventive security activities. If 
individuals in a company were reluctant to accept 
preventive security principles but felt that it was 
necessary for the company, such a principle could be 
enforced by a company-level policy. 
2.3.3 Privacy Research 
According to privacy research in the information 
systems community, many agree that the privacy issue 
is a multidisciplinary diverse concept (Oetzel & 
Spiekermann, 2014). Thus, a broad range of studies on 
privacy deals with various aspects from different 
angles and points of view. Bélanger and Crossler 
(2011) have nicely and thoroughly reviewed the 
literature regarding privacy in the field of information 
systems.2 They concluded that most privacy studies in 
the information systems domain have been conducted 
at the individual level of analysis.  
Although these studies are important in understanding 
privacy concerns and the attitudes of users under 
various practices and circumstances, they are not 
sufficient in providing actionable solutions. In this 
regard, Bélanger and Crossler (2011) highlighted the 
following: “Information systems research should focus 
more on design and action with an emphasis on 
building actual implantable tools to protect 
information privacy.” They also argued that it is 
necessary to conduct privacy-related studies at the 
societal level rather than at individual, group, or 
organizational levels. Similarly, Pavlou (2011) 
suggested that future studies on privacy in the 
information systems domain should address the design 
science perspective, which aims to build the tools and 
technologies regarding various aspects of information 
privacy. He also emphasized that future studies should 
examine users’ incentives from the point of view of the 
economics of information privacy.  
It seems that the fifth principle of privacy protection in 
Bright Internet research is very much in line with this 
sentiment. Designing a preventive security scheme 
without infringing on privacy is a very important and 
challenging issue. If we regard all netizens 
homogeneously, then security and privacy have a 
nondominated relationship with each other, which 
means that it is necessary to sacrifice one element in 
the future direction of studies suggested by review papers 
(Bélanger & Crossler, 2011; Pavlou, 2011). 
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order to realize the other. However, if we distinguish 
innocent netizens from criminal ones, it will be 
possible to design a preventive security system against 
criminal netizens while protecting the privacy of 
innocent netizens. This is a goal that Bright Internet 
research must fulfill. 
3 Validation of Bright Internet 
Principles 
Justifying the validity of the goals and design 
principles of the Bright Internet requires an appropriate 
research framework. For this purpose, we propose two 
approaches: prevention motivation theory and 
analogical social norm theory. We hypothesize these 
theories so that follow-on researchers can test them 
with data. Future research on the theoretical 
implications of the principles and the identification of 
their antecedents are open research questions. Such 
research would potentially evaluate the pros and cons 
of the current principles, add new principles, or replace 
certain principles with more effective principles.  
3.1 Validation with Reference Theories 
3.1.1 Prevention Motivation Theory 
We argue that the design goals of the Bright Internet 
should be justified by the seriousness of prevention 
motivation. The prevention motivation has been 
widely implemented in the field of preventive 
medicine. We term this concept prevention motivation 
theory. This theory is similar to protection motivation 
theory (Rogers, 1975) in a social context, which 
maintains that people take protective actions in relation 
to their fear of a severe threat and the high probability 
of its occurrence. Prevention motivation theory, on the 
other hand, also considers additional factors—the 
possibility of self-protection failure, the possibility of 
preventively eliminating the origins of cyberattacks, 
and the cost-effectiveness gap between prevention and 
protection. In other words, if Internet users are 
increasingly fearful of cybersecurity threats with a 
high probability due to the possibility of protection 
failures, it can be argued that designing the proper 
goals and principles to prevent potential sources of 
threat is of benefit to society. Despite the importance 
of the preventive approach, this aspect has been largely 
neglected in previous studies. 
In order to measure the individual’s prevention 
motivation using the Bright Internet, Cho and Lee 
(2016) conducted a preliminary survey on the security 
risk perceptions of approximately 1,500 netizens in 
Korea. Based on the classification of cybercrime 
statistics from the FBI and the ITU, they selected the 
seven most commonly occurring security risk factors 
on the Internet for this survey—cyberterror, financial 
fraud, privacy leakage, flaming/trolls, online 
censorship, spam emails, and child-harmful content. 
The survey results are summarized in Table 1, 
indicating that most survey respondents believed the 
current Internet space to be either “very vulnerable” or 
“vulnerable” to each risk factor. That is, it is necessary 
to adopt new principles of the Bright Internet to 
prevent or reduce prominent sources of risk on the 
Internet. A group of researchers is currently working 
on the theoretical development and a comparative 
international study on this topic. This global research 
partnership offers an open opportunity for scholars in 
relevant fields of study.
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Vulnerability Perceptions toward the Current Internet 
 Cyberterror Financial Fraud 
Privacy 
Leakage 
Flaming and 
Trolls 
Online 
Censorship Spam Emails 
Child-
harmful 
Content 
Mean 2.079 2.163 1.707 1.725 2.083 1.619 1.748 
Std. Dev. 0.803 0.869 0.814 0.863 0.852 0.798 0.859 
Note: degree of vulnerability perception (1: very vulnerable; 5: very protective) 
3.1.2 Analogical Social Norm Theory 
To justify the validity of design principles that have not 
yet been physically implemented, it is reasonable to 
infer implicit social norms about the principles from 
similar existing conventions. We call the justification 
approach based on analogical references the analogical 
social norm theory. In the case of the Bright Internet, 
inquiring about social norms regarding a nonexisting 
complex artifact is very difficult, and thus, ordinary 
respondents cannot precisely understand the meaning 
of these principles. Therefore, as Chaturvedi, Dolk, 
and Drnevich (2011) have argued, such inquiries may 
be guided by analogical reference cases. Identifying 
the suitable analogical social norms can serve as the 
first step of persuasion. Elster (1989) studied the effect 
of self-interest in building social norms, and Coleman 
(1990) found that social sanctions enforce social 
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norms. In this paper, we demonstrate analogical cases 
about the Bright Internet principles which we have 
identified so far. Further study in terms of legal 
perspectives will reveal additional social norms. For 
instance, ten statements of the Internet Peace 
Principles were derived from two analogical 
conventions from non-IT domains, including the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
in addition to four extendable traditional conventions 
(Shin et al., 2018). 
3.2 Validation of Principles 
We now turn to defining the five design principles, and 
justifying them individually based on prevention 
motivation and analogical social norms (social norms, 
in short). 
3.2.1 Principle of Origin Responsibility 
Definition: The principle of origin responsibility 
means that the offensive originators of malicious codes 
and illegal hacking should be responsible for the 
consequences of their malicious behaviors. 
Under the principle of origin responsibility, the ethics 
of computer users should be extended to the level of 
avoiding attacking others in order to socially protect 
one another. To prevent cybercrimes and cyberterror, 
the responsible origin IP address and real names should 
be traceable if the cyberattack is detected and a 
legitimate search warrant is issued. However, 
criminals spoof their origin IPs and hide their real 
names. That is why the complementary principles of 
deliverer responsibility and identifiable anonymity are 
necessary. 
Prevention Motivation   
Billions of spam emails, possibly with hidden 
malicious codes, are sent globally every day, 
occupying about 54.2% of all email traffic 
(Shcherbakova, Vergelis, & Demidova, 2015). 
Therefore, it is impossible to protect individual 
recipients from such attacks by through protective 
measures alone without eliminating the originators of 
malicious emissions. According to deterrence theory, 
tracing the origins of responsibility is the most 
effective scheme for the prevention of cyberattacks 
(Herath & Rao, 2009a; Nagin, 2013). As a result, it is 
necessary to identify the originators and make them 
take responsibility for the consequences they have 
caused. To realize this principle, it is necessary to 
design the Internet protocol so that it can 
fundamentally prevent spoofing, possibly by using 
IPv6.   
Social Norms 
This principle is almost a natural law in human society; 
however, it has not played out that way in anonymous 
cyberspace. In the current protective security paradigm 
of the Internet, anonymous attackers from detoured 
countries can hide their origins, and victims at the 
destination end up taking the responsibility, which 
contradicts the ethical standards of civilized society.  
The treatment of electronic hardware waste serves as 
an interesting reference practice. The European Union 
(EU) Directive of Waste Electronic and Electric 
Equipment (WEEE) (Rossem, 2008) adopted the 
principle of individual producer responsibility for the 
safe disposal of electronic waste (Lee, 2015). Through 
adopting this principle, third-party waste collectors, 
such as the Europe Recycle Platform in Europe, 
collected 2 million tons of electronic waste across 17 
countries in 2014 (ERP, 2014). Introducing non-
monopolistic business practices for waste collection 
led to a decrease in collection costs from 70 euro cents 
per kilogram in 2005 to 7.5 euro cents in 2007 (Lee & 
Shao, 2009).  
This example provides analogical insight into how to 
best control the spread of malicious software codes 
through adopting the principle of origin responsibility, 
by illustrating how this principle could potentially 
reduce the generation of malcodes and reduce 
operational costs through competition. As such, 
adopting this principle could create a quantum leap in 
terms of cybersecurity ethics and new business models.  
Chain of Origin Responsibility  
However, it is not always clear who the responsible 
origin is. There are many layers of origins, including 
the individual, server, company, and country (Lee, 
2015). The concept of origin will require further 
classification in terms of each role—including the 
maker, owner, user (e.g., hacker or passenger), and 
driver (e.g., software agent or autonomous car)—as the 
application expands to the IoT domain. The legal 
responsibility of roles must be defined, and the 
responsible role performer should be traceable if a 
crime is detected.  
As a first step of research, let us assume a simple case 
of a hacker accessing an origin IP and conducting 
malicious cyberattacks. The elementary base of origin 
is the individual who accesses a server, sends 
malicious messages, and/or hacks other sites; and the 
responsibility of an individual’s misconduct should be 
borne by the originating individual. These kinds of 
offensive originators can be identified by an innocent 
server manager who can easily verify and control 
them. However, if the individual is not identifiable due 
to the negligence or malicious intention of the server 
manager, the server manager, or the company at a 
higher level of the chain, should take full or partial 
responsibility for the individual’s misconduct. 
Therefore, a regulation should be established to 
implement a chain of responsibility in order to prevent 
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intentional evasion by a company. As such, a chain of 
reporting responsibility is necessary, as described 
below.  
Individual-layer origin: If an individual user of a server 
acts maliciously through a server, the server manager 
should be able to trace the individual in order to stop 
the behavior and possibly request compensation for the 
behavior and/or consequences. This concerns the 
individual layer of the origin. Thus, it is necessary to 
motivate server managers to take such actions. 
Chained responsibility will motivate server managers 
to prevent the unidentified malicious use of their 
servers and encourage the use of a system that traces 
malicious individuals who repetitively misuse their 
servers. Public Internet service providers, such as 
cloud service providers, game rooms, and Wi-Fi 
services, should be alerted so that their servers do not 
become a backdoor for criminal activity. Recently, the 
European Union’s highest court decided to advise open 
Wi-Fi hotspot owners to require users to input 
passwords and to be capable of confirming their 
identities (Orlowski, 2016). There is a societal tradeoff 
between free access and security. 
Server-layer origin: If a company has multiple servers, 
each server manager can operate as the center of 
responsibility from the company’s point of view. If the 
server managers themselves have malicious intentions, 
they will not trace or report the individual origin’s 
malicious behaviors in which they are involved. This 
means that the company who owns the server should 
monitor the behavior of the server managers, or risk 
being held responsible for their negligence. This chain 
of responsibility will motivate companies to monitor 
and prevent their servers from being misused. 
Company-layer origin: Companies comprise the next 
level of responsibility for those who use their 
computing resources. These companies should monitor 
whether their resources are being misused to attack 
others. However, if a company itself is a malicious 
organization, the government is the authority who 
should monitor the malicious behaviors of such 
companies. If the company does not fulfill its reporting 
responsibility, even though there is clear evidence 
provided by the victims of their attacks, the company 
itself should be regarded as a malicious organization. 
Such malicious companies should be monitored by an 
authorized government agency. This is analogous to a 
corporation’s tax reporting responsibility regarding 
their employees’ taxes. 
Country-layer origin: The country is the highest level 
of responsibility. However, if a country itself is the 
origin of cyberterrorism, the government will not trace 
                                                     
3 For more information, visit the website 
www.digitalattackmap.com to see daily DDOS attacks 
worldwide. 
or report the responsible company or individual origin 
(Shin et al., 2018). In this case, the country should be 
monitored by a global governance body and should be 
held responsible for its malicious behaviors. The 
global governance body should enforce the Internet 
Peace Principles, measure damages, and determine 
appropriate compensation and sanctions. The chain of 
origin responsibility demonstrates the need for 
protocols, technologies, national regulations, and 
international agreements. 
3.2.2 Principle of Deliverer Responsibility 
Definition: The principle of deliverer responsibility 
means that compromised computers or Internet service 
providers who are involved in the delivery process of 
cyberattacks, even unintentionally, should cooperate 
to prevent delivering identifiable harms to the users at 
the destination.  
Under the principle of deliverer responsibility, the 
ethics of computer users should extend to the level of 
not being abused to attack others so as to socially 
protect one another. 
Prevention Motivation 
Research suggests that 90% of spam emails are sent 
from compromised computers (Lawson, 2012), and 
typical DDoS attacks utilize millions of compromised 
computers. This phenomenon demonstrates that it is 
essential to make an effort to protect all computers so 
that they will not be compromised as deliverers of 
malicious codes.3 A security software provider could 
potentially extend the function of their solution to 
include the principle of deliverer responsibility. 
The second type of deliverer is the Internet service 
provider (ISP), which carries out most of the last-mile 
delivery. In Korea, the top 10 ISPs delivered 86% of 
spam mails. These spam emails may include phishing, 
scams, and malware. However, ISPs do not filter these 
spam emails because they prefer to maintain network 
neutrality and do not want to take responsibility for 
harmful delivery. Nevertheless, ISPs should cooperate 
with the prevention of malicious code dissemination. 
As such, the principle of deliverer responsibility is 
necessary because the principle of origin responsibility 
alone cannot completely eliminate malicious attacks.  
Social Norms Concerning Comprised Computers 
as Deliverers 
An analogy for deliverer responsibility is the 
misuse of stolen guns, whether or not the owner 
recognizes them as stolen. It is controversial how much 
legal responsibility should be accepted for carelessness 
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or negligence in preventing the malicious misuse of 
risk-creating items. Nevertheless, most netizens agree 
that we should protect one another. As a result, a 
security software solution provider, possibly in 
cooperation with the OS provider, could install and 
update preventive tools with appropriate business 
models and/or regulations. 
Social Norms Concerning Internet Service 
Providers as Deliverers 
The Council of the European Convention on 
Cybercrime stipulates that ISPs in Europe are 
responsible for surveillance. China also allows 
surveillance. The USA and Korea have not allowed 
surveillance in the past; however, recently their 
congresses have passed antiterrorism acts to detect 
plots and prevent serious acts of terrorism. Therefore, 
it seems that it would be reasonable to empower ISPs 
to filter identifiable malicious messages. Whether ISPs 
or security authorities should conduct such 
surveillance is a design issue.  
Analogical cases can be found in the inspection areas 
at airports and monitoring by CCTV. Therefore, this 
practice is analogous to the ISP-based surveillance in 
cyberspace. Records of innocent citizens on CCTV 
should not be traced unless the records are associated 
with certain incidents. Similarly, ISP-based 
surveillance should make sure that it does not infringe 
on the privacy of innocent netizens. 
3.2.3 Principle of Identifiable Anonymity 
Definition: The principle of identifiable anonymity 
means that the real name or equivalent identity of 
criminal origin should be identifiable in nearly real 
time in the context of a valid search warrant, while the 
voluntary anonymity of innocent netizens should be 
preserved.  
This principle seeks to fulfill two seemingly 
conflicting goals of identifiability: the need to both 
identify criminals and to preserve the anonymity of 
innocent netizens. Thus, we must design an 
appropriate method to simultaneously meet these two 
goals. There is a difference between identifiability and 
authentication: A narrow sense of identification refers 
to confirming a real name (in contrast to a pseudonym), 
while authentication refers to confirming that the 
person is truly the same as the digital identity. A 
broader sense of identification may, perhaps, include 
the authentication process, but in this study, we adopt 
the narrow sense to distinguish between the two 
endeavors. 
Prevention Motivation 
Even though the IP address of the attack origin may be 
traced, criminal originators will not use their real 
names or the equivalent. This is why the real names of 
anonymous users should be identifiable if criminal 
behavior is detected and a valid search warrant is 
issued. Evidence of malicious behaviors often 
evaporates within a week. Blue Coat Systems 
researchers reported in their “One-Day Wonders” 
security report that 71% of host names disappear 
within less than 24 hours (Horst, 2014), and criminal 
web pages last, on average, about a week in cloud 
service sites (Kolthof, 2015). These observations 
indicate that the real-time assurances of large-scale 
traceability and identifiability against criminal actions 
are essential. 
However, human rights activists insist that online 
anonymity is necessary to protect freedom of 
expression. A few careful designs can fulfill both 
goals. For this purpose, the Bright Internet does not 
have to completely replace the current Internet 
platform, just like credit cards do not completely 
replace cash. Both may coexist, and the Bright Internet 
is an optional platform for those who want a safer 
platform for certain applications with trustworthy 
people. One person may hold accounts on both 
platforms; thus the Bright Internet will not destroy the 
possibility of online anonymity, and the concerns of 
human rights activists can be taken into consideration 
within the concept of identifiable anonymity.  
Social Norms 
It is our premise that the intention of crime can be most 
effectively deterred if the offender is identifiable. An 
extreme case of identifiable anonymity is voluntary 
real-name registration, as is already done to register 
credit cards and online banking accounts. Unless a 
cardholder commits a financial crime, the client’s 
private records should be protected and should not be 
illegally disclosed. The business benefit of real-name 
registration can be seen in a case involving online 
auction markets. In 2002, auction.co.kr in Korea (the 
current eBay Korea) required real names to eliminate 
illegal cash-back transactions using credit cards. They 
were shocked by the sharp decline in the total number 
of registered clients, but it was interesting to observe 
that they achieved even higher successful bids, and 
eventually higher total revenues (Lee, 2002). This 
example demonstrates that the adequate demarketing 
of fake clients by adopting a real-name system 
enhances the level of trust and also reduces the 
unfruitful waste of resources caused by malicious 
users.  
3.2.4 Principle of Global Collaboration  
Definition: The principle of global collaboration 
means that in order to implement the principles of the 
Bright Internet on a global scale across borders, it is 
essential that Internet user countries collaborate 
globally in terms of communication, cooperation, 
execution, and reporting.
Design and Validation of the Bright Internet 
 
 
74 
Prevention Motivation 
Malicious attackers tend to detour their routes through 
third countries to obscure their origins and make 
coordination between countries more complex. Thus, 
an international agreement between the relevant 
countries to ensure cross-border traceability and 
identifiability is essential. Each country may have 
different rules of regulation for their national security. 
Thus, governments should work together to establish 
commonly accepted rules of cooperation; such 
agreements should be global in order to prevent the 
emergence of a cybercrime haven territory. 
Social Norms 
There are a few international organizations that play 
the role of global Internet governance, such as the UN 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF), UN International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), and Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), as well as academic organizations, such as 
AIS, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE), Association for Computing Machinery 
(ACM), and International Federation for Information 
Processing (IFIP). However, their activities are not 
effectively coordinated with each other toward global 
governance in terms of a safe next generation of the 
Internet. That is why forums such as the Bright Internet 
Global Summit and Bright Internet Global 
Organization (BIGO) are needed; they give 
multistakeholders the opportunity to collaborate on 
technical, policy, and global issues, and seek 
agreement on a common vision and principles. When 
the BIGO reaches consensus among member 
countries, BIGO will be able to cooperate with 
authorized governments and international 
organizations, such as the United Nations.  
3.2.5 Principle of Privacy Protection 
Definition: The principle of privacy protection here 
means that the Bright Internet system should be 
technically and legally designed in consideration of 
protecting privacy, which may be threatened by 
adopting preventive security-related principles. 
The general concept of privacy protection is very 
broad, but in this research, we focus only on the risks 
that may be introduced by adopting the four security-
related principles of the Bright Internet. The principle 
of identifiable anonymity already seeks to protect the 
privacy of innocent netizens by limiting the inquiry of 
real names only if digital search warrants are issued.  
Preventive Motivation 
Surveillance at the origin servers and deliverers may 
monitor and collect private information, which may 
increase the risk of privacy infringement. However, 
directly requiring a real name at a registration site may 
increase the risk of information leakages. Global 
collaborations may further extend the risk of privacy 
information leakages among countries. Therefore, it is 
necessary to prevent potential risks that may be caused 
by the implementation of these principles, both 
technically and legally.  
Social Norms 
As mentioned earlier, paragraph 42 of the Tunis 
Agenda states that privacy should be protected in 
balance with cybersecurity. We explicitly adopt this 
principle here, because unless the technical and legal 
protections of privacy are ensured, many netizens will 
be reluctant to accept preventive security principles, 
even if they agree with the necessity of preventive 
security. Designers of the preventive security scheme 
should take privacy protection into account, in order to 
avoid, or at least minimize, such a risk.  
4 Design of the Bright Internet 
4.1 Design Theory of Bright Internet 
Research 
Designing the Bright Internet based on the above-
mentioned principles necessitates a holistic design of a 
global scale Internet infrastructure and a global 
governance structure. So far, there has been design 
science research at the firm level (e.g., Adomavicius, 
Bockstedt, Gupta, & Kauffman, 2008), but no previous 
publications in the information systems field have 
investigated the design of a new Internet platform 
capable of preventing the sources of security threat. In 
this sense, Bright Internet research can be regarded as 
a global information system infrastructure creating the 
foundation for all future business and social 
information systems.  
For this purpose, Figure 4 proposes the framework of 
the design activities of global societal information 
infrastructure, which our design of the Bright Internet 
1.0 in this section instantiates, and which contrasts 
with the design activities of organizational information 
systems (Hevner et al., 2004). To justify the fit with the 
design science framework, Bright Internet design 
activity is reviewed in Section 5 from the perspective 
of seven guidelines (Hevner et al., 2004): the artifact, 
relevance, design evaluation, research contribution, 
research rigor, design as a search process, and 
communication of research. 
Since we cannot demonstrate design principles with a 
developed prototype of a complex system in its 
beginning stages, our design principles can be regarded 
as a top-level prescriptive design specification 
(Kuecheler & Vaishnavi, 2012). The constructs and 
variables (Arnott & Pervan, 2012) can be derived from 
these design principles. The complex global 
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information infrastructure should simultaneously 
encompass the domains of technologies, national 
policies, and global collaboration, because these 
variables are tightly interrelated with one another. 
 
Figure 4. Design Activities for the Global 
Societal Information Infrastructure 
4.2 Principles-Driven Holistic Design 
Based on the five principles of the Bright Internet 
proposed above, we prescriptively design three 
constructs (technologies, policies, and global 
collaboration) and design variables as follows. 
4.2.1 Prescriptive Design Process 
Step 1 (technology design): For each principle, define 
the necessary technologies by designing the protocols 
and systems.  
Step 1a: Identify what new technological research 
is necessary to meet the technological requirement. 
Step 2 (policy design): Define the national policies that 
are consistent with the technological design. 
Step 2a: Identify what laws and regulations should 
be established and/or amended to realize the new 
policies. 
Step 3 (global collaboration design): Define the global 
collaborations that are necessary among countries that 
are compatible with the national laws and technologies.   
Step 3a: Identify what new global agreements and 
governance are necessary. 
The beauty of the prescriptive design is that is allows 
us to build an experimental test bed for technology, 
policy and global collaboration, which provides the 
starting point of discussion. It will be necessary to 
gather feedback and learn from the design of a complex 
sociotechnical system. Recall the Simonian artifice 
mode of inquiry in design science, which requires 
constructive interactions among people, artifacts, and 
the environment (Baskerville, Kaul, & Storey, 2015). 
As such, if an agreement about national policy and/or 
global collaboration cannot be reached, at a certain 
point we will need to propagate the constraints back to 
the technical design and keep consistency within it. As 
such, understanding the interaction effect between 
policy and technology is important for a consistent 
design. To ensure consistency between design 
variables, it may be necessary to employ the notion of 
constraint satisfaction problems (Lee & Kwon, 1995).  
The importance of prescriptive knowledge in design 
science research is recognized as Singerian progress by 
Baskerville et al. (2015). More than one design can 
achieve the principles, and designs should thus 
compete with each other, with more innovative designs 
replacing older ones. Considering the interactions 
among the design variables, the design process can be 
iterative. In this paper, we demonstrate the design of 
Bright Internet 1.0 as the first outcome of our own 
research. The target of this research is an invention of 
a new system, in contrast with the improvements and 
exaptations presented in other studies (Gregor & 
Hevner, 2013), according to the science of the artificial 
perspective (Simon, 1996).  
4.2.2 Business Model Driven Deployment 
Strategy 
The holistic design is comprehensive, but full-fledged 
development and deployment will take a long time. 
Thus, a middle-out deployment approach with killer 
applications will be necessary.  According to this 
approach, not all principles must necessarily be 
adopted at once, depending on the goals of the 
applications. For instance, a cloud service provider 
could the Bright Internet platform, building Bright 
Cloud Services. Multiple Bright Clouds could be 
connected to each other via a virtual private network 
expanding to the Bright Cloud Extended Network. The 
origins of tenets in the Bright Cloud Extended Network 
would be identifiable to each other and thus could trust 
each other. Thus, this idea could be a new business 
model motivating cloud service providers to upgrade 
their services with a high level of trust. As additional 
cloud service providers join the Bright Cloud Extended 
Network, the Bright Internet could be propagated 
accordingly. 
Another appealing application would be Bright E-mail 
services. Victims of malicious spam mails could report 
them to the Bright Internet Center, which would work 
with lawyers to file collective compensation lawsuits 
against the malicious origins. The Bright Internet 
Center would also globally publicize the bad neighbors, 
which would encourage origin servers to perform 
origin responsibility to protect their own businesses. 
The collected compensation could be paid back to 
reporting victims, and this—in addition to the 
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increased collective security—would incentivize them 
to report. Bright E-commerce, Bright Auctions, Bright 
Shared Economies, Bright Fintech and Bright IoT are 
all potential applications of the Bright Internet 
platform, as depicted in the application layer of Figure 
1. Such applications will increase the popularity of the 
Bright Internet, and motivate businesses to move to the 
Bright Internet platform. 
4.3 Design of the Bright Internet 1.0 
We demonstrate the design of the Bright Internet 1.0 in 
terms of the technologies, policies and global 
collaborations, as depicted in Figure 5. Note the 
interrelationship among them, as we describe them 
individually below. 
4.4 Design of Technologies 
The design variables of different technologies are 
classified by the principles denoted by TO 
(technologies for origin responsibility), TD 
(technologies for deliverer responsibilities), TI 
(technologies for identifiable anonymity), TG 
(technologies for global collaboration), and TP 
(technologies for privacy protection). 
 
 
Figure 5. Design Variables and their Relationships 
 
4.4.1 Technologies for Origin 
Responsibility (TO) 
Technologies for origin responsibility are necessary 
for the prevention of outgoing malicious codes (TO1), 
identification of parsimonious surveilling targets 
(TO1a), record-keeping of repeatable risk sources 
(TO2), evaluation of the impact of attacks (TO2a), 
victim-initiated reporting procedures (TO3), overall 
architecture and process for the management of origin 
responsibility (TO4), and traceability of the origin IP 
address (TO5).  
TO1: Architecture of an origin-based preventive 
system  
TO1a: Identification the parsimonious target 
objects of origin server’s surveillance 
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TO2: Sharing mechanism of the list of repeatable 
risk sources 
TO2a: Development of the evaluation model 
of attacks and attackers  
TO3: Victim-initiated reporting procedure  
TO4: Architecture, management, and protocol of 
origin responsibility  
TO5: Technology for origin IP address 
traceability  
For screening in TO1, the antivirus vaccine software 
and other intrusion detection systems may be applied 
in reverse. The victim-initiated reporting procedure 
will create an origin-destination relationship matrix 
database of malicious codes, which can motivate 
originators to reduce the generation of malicious 
codes. Tracing technology for TO5 may not be 
possible on a simple TCP/IPv4. Therefore, we need to 
upgrade the Internet protocol to the improved IPv6 in 
order to prevent the fabrication of the original IP 
address (Bi, 2016). 
4.4.2 Technologies for Deliverer 
Responsibility (TD) 
Technologies for deliverer responsibility will be used 
to prevent zombie computer attacks and screen 
malicious codes during the intermediator’s routing 
process. These technologies are necessary to filter the 
malcodes that were not screened out by origin servers. 
Since it is not easy for ordinary users to take preventive 
actions to avoid being compromised, the security 
solution and/or operating system software makers 
should take preventive measures on behalf of PC or 
smartphone owners (for TD1). Likewise, a security 
solution provider may take preventive measures for the 
network (for TD2 and TD2a). 
TD1: Design of the preventive system for potential 
zombie computers   
TD2: Design of the intermediator-based 
preventive surveillance system  
TD2a: Identification of the parsimonious 
target objects of the intermediator’s 
surveillance  
4.4.3 Technologies for Identifiable 
Anonymity (TI) 
Technologies necessary for identifiable anonymity 
include the architecture of identifiable anonymity, 
methods of real-name identification, and digital search 
warrant management systems. 
TI1: Development of the architecture for 
identifiable anonymity  
TI2: Adoption of appropriate methods for direct 
and indirect real-name identification  
TI3: Development of digital search warrant 
management systems  
The architecture of TI1 will adopt two layers of 
identification: The freedom of expression layer with 
pseudonyms and the security layer with real names, as 
in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Freedom of Expression Layer and 
Preventive Security Layer 
The methods for real-name identification for TI2 can 
be classified as direct identification and indirect 
identification. A suitable method may be selected, 
depending on the company’s strategy.  
a. Pure real-name identification: If real names are 
already adopted, such as in banking systems, they 
can be shared for the Bright Internet applications. 
b. Direct identification: Pseudonyms and real names 
are collected directly and stored simultaneously. 
1. Parallel identification: When a real name can 
be confirmed at the registration site, both the 
pseudonym and real name can be collected 
simultaneously. Some offline business 
partners, such as banks and telecom 
companies, can authenticate and register both 
names together.  
2. Certificate extended identification: When 
there are certified real names already 
registered for a certain application, such as a 
certification authority, credit card or bank 
account, the pseudonym may be linked to 
these certified sources, which can be used a 
source of real names.  
c. Indirect identification: If the clients of an 
organization, such as Google Gmail, fear the 
leakage of stored real names, the real name can be 
inferred from multiple indirect data, rather than 
stored directly. For instance, Airbnb does not 
require a certificate at remote sites, but requests 
multidimensional information, such as e-mail 
address, phone number, SNS site, work address, 
and personal information, which can be of help for 
the inference of real names. However, the indirect 
method may not definitely guarantee the 
identifiability of real names. In case a service 
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organization fails to identify the real name, it is 
debatable how much the organization should take 
responsibility for the evaded damages. 
The digital search warrant management system in TI3 
requires the function of application, issuance, 
execution, and reporting procedures. To handle 
thousands of cases every day consistently and 
efficiently, a rule-based supporting tool may be 
necessary. 
4.4.4 Technologies for Global 
Collaboration (TG) 
When the technologies developed for the three 
security-related principles are applied across national 
borders, factors that occur between countries become 
important. When two countries have different policies, 
they must first establish commonly agreeable 
collaboration that is mutually beneficial in fighting 
cybercrime. The global collaboration model applied to 
multiple countries for each technology, is denoted as 
TG, followed by O, D, and I, depending on the basic 
technologies in the TO, TD and TI categories. 
TG-O2: Mechanism of the list of repeatable risk 
sources on a global scale 
TG-O2a: Global evaluation model of attacks and 
attackers 
TG-O3: Global victim-initiated reporting procedure 
TG-O4: Global architecture and protocol standard for 
Bright Internet principles  
TG-O5: Technology for origin IP address traceability 
in the global context 
TG-D1: Global preventive system for potential zombie 
computers   
TG-D2: Intermediator-based preventive surveillance 
system across borders   
TG-D2a: Identification of the parsimonious target 
objects of the intermediator’s surveillance across 
borders 
TG-11: Architecture for identifiable anonymity in the 
global context 
TG-I2: Methods for direct and indirect real-name 
identification in the global context 
TG-I3: Digital search warrant management systems 
across borders 
4.4.5 Technologies for Privacy Protection 
(TP) 
Privacy protection technologies aim to audit the Bright 
Internet system to insure that there is no illegitimate 
infringement of innocent netizens’ privacy by the 
surveilling agents. The design seeks to maintain 
privacy by empowering a trustworthy technical and 
legal audit capacity, while maintaining preventive 
security. The auditing process should cover all of the 
following principles. 
TP-O: Privacy protection audit against origin 
responsibility 
Minimize the number of surveillance objects by 
utilizing data analysis techniques effectively. 
TP-D: Privacy protection audit against deliverer 
responsibility 
Audit the risk of surveilled information being used 
maliciously. 
TP-I: Privacy protection audit against identifiable 
anonymity 
Audit the risk of real-name information being 
leaked. 
TP-G: Privacy protection audit against global 
collaboration 
Audit the activities of the surveilling agents of 
relevant countries if the digital search warrants are 
applied or issued invalidly, and if the exchanged 
information between countries is being used 
maliciously. 
4.5 Propagation to Policy and Global 
Collaboration 
Through the prescriptive design of technologies, 
consistent policies can emerge. These policies can 
serve as starting points for analyzing current laws and 
regulations to identify which policies conform to the 
current laws, and which should be amended and newly 
established. 
4.5.1 Design of National Policy 
PO1: Encourage origin servers and their owning 
companies to eliminate outgoing malcodes and illegal 
behavior. 
PO1a: Require the originating individual and 
organization of illegal attacking behavior to be 
responsible for its behavior and consequences. 
PO2: Support blacklist management, which can 
contribute to preventing repeated illegal behaviors. 
PO2a: Support the evaluation of the origin and 
destination of offensive attacks. 
PO3: Support servers being equipped with a victim-
initiated reporting procedure. 
PO4: Support the research, development, testing, and 
deployment of the Bright Internet system. 
PO5: Require the traceability of origin IP addresses. 
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PD1: Encourage relevant security software providers 
to prevent potential zombie computers from being 
employed by hackers. 
PD2: Encourage relevant security agents to conduct 
proactive surveillance over ISPs or carriers to prevent 
the delivery of obviously malicious codes that can 
harm the receivers.   
PD2a: Allow rule-based identification of 
surveilling objects by ISPs or carriers. 
PI1: Encourage a two-layered architecture of a 
pseudonym and a real name to realize identifiable 
anonymity. 
PI2: Require the identifiability of the originator, 
directly or indirectly, when the valid search warrant 
requires it.  
PI2a: Require the organizations who adopt the a 
posteriori indirect identification method to be 
responsible for missed identification of 
originators.  
PI3: Encourage a national standard process of digital 
search warrant management to be compatible with a 
global standard procedure. 
PI3a: Allow the digital search warrant process to 
be assisted by a rule-based system. 
PP1: Support privacy protection audits against origin 
and deliverer responsibility procedures. 
PP2: Support privacy protection audits against 
blacklist management. 
PP3: Support privacy protection audits against 
identifiable anonymity procedures. 
PP4: Allow a trustworthy third party to audit for the 
prevention of privacy infringement.  
PG1: Recommend adopting privacy protection audits 
for global collaboration procedures. 
4.5.2 Design of Global Collaboration 
Likewise, all designs of technologies and policies need 
to be extended to the global context.  
GO1: Encourage origin servers and their owning 
companies in all countries to eliminate outgoing 
malcodes and illegal behavior.  
GO1a: Require the originating individual and 
organization of illegal attacking behavior to be 
responsible for its behavior and consequences in 
all countries. 
GO2: Support global scale blacklist management 
while maintaining each country’s sovereignty. 
GO2a: Support the evaluation of the origin and 
destination of offensive attacks on a global scale. 
GO3: Support servers being equipped with a victim-
initiated reporting procedure in a global setting. 
GO4: Support the research, development, testing, and 
deployment of the Bright Internet system on a global 
scale. 
GO5: Require the global traceability of origin IP 
addresses. 
GD1: Encourage relevant software providers to 
prevent potential zombie computers from being 
employed by hackers on a global scale. 
GD2: Encourage relevant security agents to conduct 
proactive surveillance over ISPs or carriers on a 
global scale to prevent the delivery of obvious 
malicious codes that can harm receivers.  
GD2a: Allow rule-based identification of 
surveillance objects by ISPs or carriers on a 
global scale.  
GI1: Encourage a two-layered architecture of a 
pseudonym and a real name on a global scale. 
GI2: Require the global identifiability of an originator, 
directly or indirectly, when the valid search warrant 
requires it across borders.  
GI2a: Require that organizations adopting the a 
posteriori indirect identification method be 
globally responsible for the missed identification 
of originators. 
GI3: Encourage a global standard process of digital 
search warrant management. 
GI3a: Allow a global digital search warrant 
process to be assisted by a rule-based system. 
GP1: Support global privacy protection audits against 
origin and deliverer responsibility procedures. 
GP2: Support global privacy protection audits against 
blacklist management. 
GP3: Support global privacy protection audits against 
identifiable anonymity procedures. 
GP4: Allow a trustworthy third party to conduct audits 
to prevent privacy infringements in a globally 
coordinated manner. 
GG1: Recommend global privacy protection audits 
associated with global collaboration procedures. 
By deriving a draft of prescriptive international 
agreements as above, stakeholders can analyze the 
current international agreements and treaties from this 
perspective, and can identify what should be amended 
and/or added. Governmental representatives will also 
need to consider the Internet Peace Principles and 
include them in national cybersecurity policies. These 
issues may be discussed at the Bright Internet Global 
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Summit. The summit will invite all stakeholders of 
relevant international organizations, government 
agencies, researcher groups, and business 
representatives. During the policy and global 
collaboration analysis procedure, we may encounter 
new factors that have not been previously recognized. 
This kind of recognition will be the point of systematic 
discussion for the refinement of the initial design.  
5 Summary and Concluding 
Remarks 
5.1 Summary 
The Bright Internet is proposed as a preventive security 
paradigm, in contrast with the current self-centric 
protective security paradigm. For this purpose, the 
principles of origin responsibility and deliverer 
responsibility on a global scale are adopted. However, 
these preventive security-related principles may limit 
the freedom of anonymous expression. Thus, the 
principle of identifiable anonymity is adopted in order 
to protect the freedom of anonymous expression for 
innocent netizens, also facilitating the traceability and 
identifiability of criminal origins. In addition, the 
principle of privacy protection is adopted by requiring 
audit capabilities that are superimposed on security 
surveillance. Each of these four principles should be 
applicable in the context of global collaboration. As 
such, these five cooperative principles are essential in 
fulfilling the three seemingly conflicting goals of 
preventive security, privacy protection, and freedom of 
expression for innocent netizens. 
Most previous research in information systems 
security and privacy has dealt with the behavioral 
aspects of individuals and organizations, and has 
assumed that external attacks on the current Internet 
platform are uncontrollable. In this regard, the design 
research of the Bright Internet can be contrasted with 
these studies, in that it focuses on the societal level of 
design theory research on a global scale. Since the 
scale of the target system is enormous, and it is not 
possible to demonstrate the implemented system at its 
beginning stages, we adopted two ways of justifying 
the design principles. One is based on prevention 
motivation theory, and the other on analogical social 
norms, which demonstrate that the same spirit is 
already applied in different contexts in the real world. 
To prescriptively design the first version of the Bright 
Internet 1.0, an outline of the necessary technologies 
are derived from the principles. The necessary policies 
are consistently derived from the technology 
specifications, and are then extended to the need for 
global collaboration. This proposition can become the 
starting point toward an agreement of commonly 
acceptable policies in spite of differences in culture, 
law, and national security status. As a channel of global 
communication, AIS has established the Bright 
Internet Global Summit, where all stakeholders can 
meet together and exchange ideas. 
5.2 Reviews with the Design Science 
Perspective 
To validate the design of the Bright Internet from the 
perspective of the design science framework (Von 
Alan, March, Park, & Ram, 2004), we review our work 
with the seven design science research guidelines, as 
was also done by Arnott and Pervan (2012) and Gregor 
and Jones (2007).  
1. Design as an Artifact: The Bright Internet is 
aimed at designing an artifact infrastructure, 
guided by design goals and principles, and Bright 
Internet 1.0 is a prototypical prescriptive design 
that encompasses relevant technologies, policies, 
and global collaborations. 
2. Problem Relevance: The design principles are 
basically justified by prevention motivation and 
analogical social norms. However, further 
experimental studies will be necessary. 
3. Design Evaluation: The initial design is evaluated 
by the justification of principles, consistency 
between principles and design variables in three 
constructs of technologies, policies and global 
collaborations. 
4. Research Contributions: The primary 
contribution of Bright Internet research is that it 
proposes a preventive security paradigm for the 
Internet, while balancing it with the goals of 
privacy protection and the freedom of anonymous 
expression for innocent netizens. For this purpose, 
we propose and basically justify three goals and 
five design principles. Based on these principles, 
we derive the prescriptive design of necessary 
technologies, policies and global collaborations. 
5. Research Rigor: Our analysis of prevention 
motivation theory and analogical social norm 
theory justifies the principles. The principles 
should be further evaluated by subsequent survey 
studies, and it will also be necessary to explore the 
effect of cultural differences. Furthermore, 
consistent designs will emerge from prescriptive 
technologies, policies, and global collaborations. 
6. Design as a Search Process: There can be more 
than one design with the principles, and 
competition between designs will create a more 
cost-effective design. We designed the Bright 
Internet 1.0; however, we expect that alternative 
designs and technologies will emerge and 
compete. Diverse business models will also create 
the application-specific deployment. Discussion 
among stakeholders will refine the design toward 
global consensus. 
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7. Communication of Research: Research on the 
Bright Internet requires the collaboration of 
diverse academic disciplines from technology, 
system building, policy, global collaboration and 
business practice. This paper will open a common 
ground of discussion among them. 
5.3 Extended Research Opportunities 
Bright Internet research can trigger research 
opportunities from various angles. It requires research 
about technologies, business models, policies, and 
global collaborations. Typical technological issues for 
preventive security are origin- and deliverer-driven 
screening and victim-driven traceability and 
identifiability, reconciliation of identifiability and 
anonymity, and auditing for privacy protection. For the 
validation of principles and technologies, wide 
behavioral research in experimental settings or 
empirical test beds must be conducted in different 
social and global contexts. Prevention motivation 
theory and analogical social norm theory can be tested 
empirically. The behavioral issues on individual- and 
organization-level studies can be explored even before 
the model is deployed in the real world, allowing 
researchers to design the future. In this manner, a 
virtuous cycle of behavioral scientific research topics 
can emerge, based on design science research. 
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